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Introduction 
On April the 3
rd, 2.4 terabyte of data from the Panamanian lawyer’s office Mossack Fonseca were 
made public. The collaborative work of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
(ICIJ) revealed how Mossack Fonseca facilitated wide-scale tax evasion through more than 214,000 
offshore entities. Connections to persons and companies in more than 200 countries and territories 
were exposed, covering a wide range of high-level persons such as politicians, sportsmen and wealthy 
elites. While the size of the Panama Papers leaks is unprecedented, so are its revelations about the 
sheer size of tax evasion through offshore constructions – especially considering that the Panama 
Papers uncovered the offshore activities of only one law firm. Given the numerous tax scandals 
provoked by whistleblowing and/or press leaks over the past decade (e.g. UBS, HSBC, SwissLeaks, 
LuxLeaks), the Panama Papers are only the latest indication that massive tax avoidance and evasion 
are a structural feature of contemporary global capitalism. In his recent book Gabriel Zucman 
estimated that about US$7,6 trillion of financial wealth is held in offshore tax havens, leading to a loss 
of tax revenue of $190 billion. His estimate of tax evasion does not take into account the even higher 
fiscal losses associated with aggressive tax planning by big businesses or individuals, which aims to 
exploit the limits of the law in order to minimise tax payments. In 2013 the European Commission 
estimated that governments in the EU loose around €1 trillion each year to tax evasion and avoidance.  
The systemic problem of tax dodging delivers an additional blow to the legitimacy of the globalised 
financial regime, whose many excesses were brought to the surface by the global financial crisis. The 
crisis created an unprecedented momentum to regulate the offshore world. Offshore financial centres 
(OFC) were blamed for contributing to the growth of the ‘shadow banking system’: the ‘light touch’ 
regulation of tax havens provided an important channel through which complex and often opaque 
derivative instruments, which were at the source of the global financial turmoil, could be wrapped and 
distributed all over the global financial system. When American and European banks had to be saved 
from bankruptcy by the use of taxpayer money, the battle against tax havens and OFCs gained 
traction. American and European politicians raised objections about bailing out banks with public 
money at a time when many of these banks were in the business of helping companies and individuals 
to avoid and evade taxes, including through their own branches in tax havens.
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 The crisis also put 
pressure on western governments to find new sources of tax revenues, as bank bailouts and 
countercyclical fiscal stabilisation policies in the aftermath of the crisis generated a huge increase in 
public deficits and debt levels. In order to bring these deficits back to normal levels, governments 
adopted harsh austerity measures that have largely affected the lower and middle classes: one study 
found that a consolidation of 1 percent of GDP is, on average, associated with an increase in income 
inequality of around 0.4-0.7 percent over the next two years (Woo et al., 2013). As a result, public 
debates have intensified on the issue of international tax evasion, the abuse of ‘unfair’ opportunities 
for international tax arbitrage by wealthy individuals and multinational corporations and the need to 
spread the burden of fiscal consolidation more evenly across society.  
The global fight against international tax evasion and avoidance is, therefore, especially important for 
the EU, whose stringent fiscal rules have forced governments in the region to embark on senselessly 
tough austerity measures. The EU and several of its Member States – France and Germany in 
particular – have been at the forefront of the global battle against tax havens and bank secrecy, yet 
they have contributed mainly through their membership of the G20 and the Organization for economic 
cooperation and development (OECD). The G20 and the OECD have been responsible for drafting an 
ambitious multilateral tax agenda in response to the global financial crisis, culminating into the 
 
 
adoption of ‘automatic exchange of information’ (AEoI) between national fiscal authorities as a new 
international standard. While AEoI is a critical instrument in the fight against tax evasion, it was the 
US rather than the EU that led the G20 and OECD to embrace the new standard. In the rest of this 
contribution we will trace the origins of AoEI and explain its importance, discussing several lessons 
that the EU could draw from the power of the US in international tax governance.           
The G20 and OECD’s fight against bank secrecy       
At their 2009 London Summit, the G20 leaders made a bold statement, declaring that ‘the era of 
banking secrecy is over.’ During the summit they mandated the OECD, which has been the most 
prominent multilateral forum for international taxation governance since the 1960s, to design an 
information-exchange regime in order to make an end to tax evasion practices: the international 
exchange of information on the ownership of foreign bank accounts and the amount of income 
generated through these accounts remains one of the most effective ways to promote transparency and 
ensure adequate taxation of foreign-earned income.   
The initial OECD response was twofold. The first solution was the adoption of an amended version of 
the multilateral convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters. This convention, 
first devised in 1988, stipulated core requirements of bilateral information exchange agreements, 
covered a broad range of taxes and allowed for joint tax investigations (Kudrle, 2014). More 
importantly, it also contained new rules for information exchange and was opened up for all countries 
(as opposed to just OECD members), thus providing a multilateral basis for the new information 
exchange regime. The second solution was a blacklist of what the OECD deemed ‘uncooperative tax 
havens’, which was an update of a previous blacklisting effort from the OECD’s 1998 harmful tax 
competition project. The OECD stipulated four criteria for a jurisdiction to be labelled as a tax haven: 
(1) very low or no taxes on business or investment income; (2) a lack of willingness to participate in 
the effective exchange of information; (3) a lack of transparency via an inappropriately high level of 
client confidentiality based on impenetrable secrecy laws; (4) no need for financial institutions and/or 
corporate structures to have a physical presence. Jurisdictions could escape the list, however, by 
signing 12 bilateral agreements on information exchange. As a result of the blacklisting efforts, more 
than 800 tax treaties have been signed since 2009, the majority of which by targeted uncooperative 
jurisdictions (Johannesen & Zucman, 2014; Palan & Wigan, 2014). 
The main problem was that these agreements only required exchange of information on request 
(EoIR), which is a deeply inadequate way of curbing tax evasion. While preferable to no information 
exchange at all, EoIR does not pierce the veil of banking secrecy and offshore companies. Generally, a 
tax administration would have to know the name of the citizen it wants to request information upon, in 
which jurisdiction his/her account is located and at which financial institution it is held in order to 
provide a well-grounded reason to request information. Otherwise the request might be labelled as a 
fishing expedition (Grinberg, 2012). Tax administrations are typically unable to offer these data, 
because this is exactly the kind of information they are looking for in the first place. Given the 
limitation of EoIR as a standard for information exchange, the G20 countries started to support the 
adoption of AEoI. The EU’s 2005 Savings Directive had already installed a regime for AEoI between 
its member states, yet offered opt-outs for Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg and only targeted savings 
accounts held in the name of owners. Accordingly, the main effect of the Savings Directive ‘has been 
to encourage Europeans … to transfer their wealth to shell corporations, trusts, and foundations’ that 
do not fall under the scope of the directive (Zucman, 2015: 72). Following an endorsement for AEoI 
from the G20 in St.Petersburg in 2013, the OECD was mandated to devise a more comprehensive 
regime that would target accounts held through intermediaries as well.   
This new regime, dubbed the ‘common reporting standard’ (CRS), introduced a uniform standard for 
AEoI and is open to all the signatories of the multilateral convention. States can either choose to 
automatically share information bilaterally by signing tax information exchange agreements or to step 
into a new multilateral framework. They can do so by signing a multilateral competent authority 
agreement (MCAA) that is based on the 2010 amended multilateral convention and activates AEoI.
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As of 2016, 80 states have signed the MCAA; 54 states have pledged to start sharing information in 
2017, while 26 others will follow suit in 2018. All member states of the EU have signed the MCAA 
and will start sharing in 2017, except for Austria which will commence sharing in 2018. In order to 
comply with the OECD’s CRS and apply the multilateral standard to its internal market, the EU had to 
amend its 2011 directive on enhanced administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (DAC) in 
2014. The amended DAC now mandates member states to share information automatically with each 
other under the same provision as the CRS starting in 2017 (except for Austria which got a one year 
delay), bringing the EU in line with international standards about AEoI (Council of the European 
union, 2014, 2015; European Commission, 2015). Because the DAC overlapped with the Savings 
Directive and had a much broader scope, the European Council repealed the directive in November 
2013 and made the DAC the single legal basis for AEoI in the EU (Council of the European union, 
2015). Panama does not participate in the CRS, yet other notorious offshore locations such as the 
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands – through which Mossack Fonseca mostly operated – 
do (OECD, 2016).  
Evidence from the Panama Papers suggests that AEoI and the CRS regime might already be bearing 
fruit in terms of transparency promotion: data from the ICIJ show a steep decline in the number of 
offshore companies incorporated by Mossack Fonseca from 2012 onwards, which coincides with the 
introduction of AEoI.
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The origins of AEoI: FATCA and its global effects 
The unwillingness of OFCs to provide information on offshore tax account to foreign authorities has 
always been an intractable problem for international tax cooperation: whereas OFCs have strong 
incentives to protect the privacy of their clients through bank secrecy laws and practices and collect no 
or very low taxes, western states have usually responded in the past by lowering tax rates to protect 
their tax base from capital flight to offshore tax havens. So how can the rise of AEoI as a new global 
norm be explained? While the EU pioneered AEoI with the Savings Directive, it was a US law that 
would serve as the catalyst for the multilateral shift to AEoI. In 2010 the US government introduced 
the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in response to the UBS offshore banking 
scandal, which revealed that many US citizens held secret Swiss bank accounts without reporting or 
paying the prevailing US taxes on these accounts. FATCA compels foreign financial institutions 
(FFIs) to gather information on the value – and income – of accounts held by US citizens or by foreign 
entities in which US citizens have a substantial interest or share, regardless of location, and report to 
the IRS beginning in 2014  (Palan & Wigan, 2014). It also compels US citizens to report information 
on certain foreign financial accounts and offshore assets, and attach it to their income tax return (IRS, 
2015). FATCA is a remarkable piece of legislation in the sense that it unilaterally demands 
compliance of financial institutions over which the US holds no direct jurisdiction. In order to 
accomplish this, the US government imposes a penalty for non-compliance in the form of a 30% 
withholding tax on US-based financial activities, such as payments from US sources and proceeds 
from US investments, from non-complying FFIs (Grinberg, 2012; IRS, 2015).  
The FATCA legislation clearly clashed with bank privacy and secrecy laws that are in place in many 
countries and make it illegal for FFIs to share account information with foreign governments. As such, 
FFIs from these countries found themselves between a rock and a hard place: they either had to break 
domestic law or face the 30% withholding tax. In order to alleviate these concerns and ensure 
maximum consistency between FATCA and foreign legislation, the US made a joint statement (early 
2012) with five European nations – Germany, France, The UK, Spain and Italy – in which they 
committed to an intergovernmental approach to FATCA. This resulted into the FATCA 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs), which come in two variants (Eccleston & Gray, 2014). Under 
model 1, FFIs have to give the required information to their domestic fiscal authorities, which in turn 
reports to US authorities. Under model 2, FFIs should share the information with the US authorities 
directly after establishing the consent of the account holder. The latter obligation explains why 
countries with stringent bank secrecy laws, such as Switzerland, have opted for a model 2 IGA.
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Nevertheless, so far 73 countries have signed model 1 IGAs while only eight chosen model 2. 26 
others have an agreement in substance on a model 1 and five more on a model 2 IGA (United States 
Treasury department, 2015). FFIs from jurisdictions that did not sign an IGA are still subject to the 
withholding tax for non-compliance. Notably, Panama had an IGA model 1 agreement in substance as 
of 2014. 
The promotion of FATCA by the US government is widely seen as a ‘game changer’ that has helped 
to dislodge the long-lasting stalemate with regard to the introduction of AEoI by ensuring the 
compliance of all the major OFCs (Emmeneger 2015; Eccleston & Gray 2014). The centrality of the 
US dollar-based financial system in the world economy endowed the US government with the 
structural power to impose FATCA agreements onto OFCs. As Emmeneger (2015: 478) explains: 
‘[T]here is virtually no possibility for a bank to be internationally active without repeatedly trading in 
US dollars, with US-based institutions, or with other banks that trade in US dollars or with US-based 
institutions. However, by doing so, international banks are, from the point of view of US regulatory 
agencies, subject to US jurisdiction.’ Due to the combination of international banks’ economic 
dependence on access to the dollar-based financial system and the ability of US authorities to control 
access to it, even ‘uncooperative’ OFCs were forced to sign FATCA agreements. The capacity of the 
US to impose AEoI onto OFCs was a key reason why the G20 endorsed the new standard and 
instructed the OECD to design a new framework. As a result, OFCs also faced international demands 
to comply with the OECD’s CRS. Given that FATCA had forced FFIs and national fiscal authorities 
in OCFs to build the infrastructure for the reporting of information, OCFs became more interested in 
applying a single global standard in order to minimise compliance costs.      
FATCA: implications and lessons for the EU  
The proliferation of bilateral FATCA-IGAs not only supported the rise of the OECD’s CRS standard. 
Interestingly, it also allowed the EU to close important loop holes in its Savings Directive by ensuring 
that even Member States with opt-outs had to adopt AEoI. First, since the 2011 DAC and its 2014 
amendment contained a most-favoured-nation clause, EU Member States have been obliged to extend 
AEoI to all EU member once they had granted it to a third state. Therefore, the need arose for a 
coherent intra-EU AEoI system after the EU member states had signed FATCA IGAs that granted 
AEoI to the US. Second, FATCA started a trend of world-wide AEoI, reducing the fear of Austria and 
Luxemburg for wide-scale capital flight to third countries as a result of the acceptance of AEoI at the 
EU level. FATCA alleviated the ‘weakest link problem’ in international tax cooperation – that is, the 
problem that the benefit of non-compliance will increase when the number of cooperating states 
increases: capital looking to evade taxation will always try to find its way to jurisdictions with less 
regulation, thus giving non-complying states a relatively larger share of the available capital. Because 
FATCA regulations operate worldwide and increase the likelihood of beyond-EU tax cooperation, 
there is less potential for capital flight to non-complying jurisdictions. Accordingly, FATCA 
diminished the weakest link repercussions of AEoI-compliance for EU member states with large 
banking sectors that benefit from financial secrecy (Hakelberg, 2014). 
The FATCA-induced adoption of AEoI by all the EU Member States raises the interesting question 
whether the EU will be more able to use its market power to impose sanctions on non-complying 
states. The inability to reach unanimity in the Council of Ministers is the main reason why the EU has 
been unable to translate market size into power in the fight against tax evasion in the past (Hakelberg, 
2016: 6). Given that EU members aiming to profit from financial secrecy (such as Luxembourg and 
Austria) were able to block mandates for the European Commission to negotiate over international tax 
issues and cooperation, their adoption of the intra-EU AEoI arguably made unanimity in the Council 
of Ministers more likely with regard to international tax issues. These member states now have 
obtained a clear interest in strengthening the ability of the EU to exert market power in order to 
maintain an international ‘level-playing-field’ and ensure compliance by jurisdictions that may aim to 
unfairly attract foreign capital and financial businesses by refusing to meet the OECD’s CRS 
requirements. In this regard, it should be noted that the euro is the world’s second reserve currency 
 
 
and that the European financial system rivals the US system in terms of market size, allowing the EU 
– in theory – to enforce compliance by such uncooperative jurisdictions and their FFIs by controlling 
their market access and imposing FATCA-like sanctions. Although its capacity to impose sanctions 
might be constrained by the fact that the EU has limited competence in tax policy (which remains 
central to the national sovereignty of the member states), the introduction of the financial transaction 
tax shows that EU Member States have been willing to collaborate in international tax matters through 
the ‘enhanced cooperation’ procedure even if unanimity is lacking. 
The need to bolster the EU’s power in international tax governance is all the more important in light of 
the lack of US commitment to reciprocate information sharing. Many scholars and observers remain 
sceptical about the extent to which the model 1 FATCA-IGAs legally binds the US to reciprocity 
(Eccleston & Gray, 2014; Hakelberg 2016). Considering that the US refused to sign to the OECD’s 
multilateral treaty, it might be possible that the US will become the world’s largest tax haven: as one 
Swiss-based lawyer recently stated, ‘How ironic— no, how perverse—that the USA, which has been 
so sanctimonious in its condemnation of Swiss banks, has become the banking secrecy jurisdiction du 
jour … That “giant sucking sound” you hear? It is the sound of money rushing to the USA’ (quoted in 
Drucker, 2016). The wide-scale interest of Europe’s rich elites in using offshore accounts to hide their 
financial wealth from their national tax authorities, as revealed by the Papama Papers, shows that the 
EU has much to benefit from guaranteeing reciprocity in information sharing by the US government. 
The history of AEoI suggests that speaking with one voice and strengthening the EU’s market power 
will be the only way to do so.   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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1
 Interestingly, the Panama Papers revealed that a subsidiary of Dexia, one of the major Belgian banks that had 
to be bailed out and nationalised in the wake of the global financial crisis, assisted in the creation of more than 
1,000 offshore accounts through Mossack Fonseca.  
2
 Based on article 6 of the multilateral convention.  
3
 See the following graph from the Panama Papers: https://panamapapers.icij.org/graphs/1/. 
4
 If bank clients are unwilling to give their consent, the FFI is required to report aggregate account information 
to the IRS. It is then possible for the IRS to lodge a ‘group request’ about these unwilling bank clients. As such, 
‘the process of information exchange under Model 2 agreements is more complex and less automated, but still 
offers a mechanism through which the IRS can monitor offshore holdings’ (Eccleston & Gray 2014: 329).   
